Tuesday, February 16, 2016

Mergers and Acquisitions - Why Companies acquire other companies and why they don't.


The reasons why companies decide to acquire or merge with other companies are manifold and are as follows:

 

1.     Diversification especially for cyclicality reduction and to ease regulatory pressures: The idea for any business is to inject new blood and diversify. Diversity and product range plays a critical part in any merger or synergy. A buying company therefore may be able to break from a cyclical or seasonal market by acquiring a company outside of its product range, thereby diversifying its product range and evading profitability fluctuations. Similarly a business may operate in a stifling regulatory environment and might want to acquire a company or a business which operates in a relatively relaxed regulatory environment. This would allow greater flexibility in operations.

 

2.     Business Model: The business model of the company being acquired may be significantly more attractive. It may offer fewer benefits or may not be hindered by unions. The acquiring company may not be in a position to replicate that model and therefore may choose to acquire it altogether.

 

3.     Intellectual Property, Licenses and Rights: A very good reason for acquisition is usually to acquire intellectual property and/or licenses and rights that the company being acquired might own or enjoy. An example of this would be Mobilink’s recent acquisition of Warid which is being done for the large part to acquire the Warid spectrum which allows for 4G LTE operations, giving Mobilink an edge. Same holds true for trademarks, copyrights and patents in other cases. 

 

4.     Market Share and Growth: One of the major reasons and usually the riskiest one is the attempt to increase market share through acquisition. This usually happens when the companies are situated in the same market. A variant of this is to achieve market growth by acquiring a company in a market that is growing faster. The first of these is risky because it is open to regulatory challenges including competition challenges.  The second variant is very similar to diversification explained above.

 

5.     Production Capacity, Product Range and Product Line: Another common reason for merger and acquisition is to either increase production capacity or fill a hole in a product line.  For example a mobile telephony company may seek to acquire a broadband WLL company to ensure that it can also offer a dongle device as part of its product range. Similarly a fixed line telephony company may acquire a mobile telephony company to ensure that it can also cater to the mobile market. Another related example of this is Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia. Microsoft wanted to take over Nokia to fill a hole in its product line i.e. smartphones. Obviously the acquisition turned out to be a colossal failure in strategy but nevertheless the idea behind it was sound.

 

6.     Sales Channels and other synergies: Another reason may be that a company might have effective sales channels and the other acquiring company may want to utilize these effective sales channels. It is not unusual for parent companies and subsidiaries to share sales channels. PTCL for example uses the sales channels of PTML Ufone which is its 100 percent owned subsidiary. So synergies in sales channels may actually be a very good reason for two companies to merge or one company to acquire another.

 

7.     Vertical integration: A company may acquire a supplier to ensure its supply lines are secured. This would be an example of backward vertical integration. In other instances forward vertical integration is also possible where a company may acquire its customer or a distributor.

 

8.     Local market expertise: A foreign company may want to acquire a local company to enter into the local market. Numerous such examples exist across the border in India, where companies have been acquired by foreign companies to acquire expertise and skills to operate in the Indian market. Such an acquisition or a merger allows a foreign buyer to acquire instantly the local market skill and expertise including knowledge of local customs, laws and obstacles germane to language and other cultural barriers.

 

9.     Defensive reasons and ulterior motives: Sometimes a company may acquire another company to become so disproportionately large that its acquisition by a third company would render it to challenges under the anti-trust and competition laws of the country. Another reason, usually an ulterior motive would be, that the management thinks having a larger company will mean greater executive compensation. This is usually a bad reason to acquire and often leads to unmitigated disaster.  Corporate greed is never a good reason for a merger or an acquisition.

 

10.  Target company’s reasons for being acquired: Equally important are the reasons for a target company or business (i.e. company that is being acquired) to allow itself to be acquired. These are:

 

a.     Anemic Profits and Survival: Usually if a company has little or no profits it would want to be acquired so as to survive.

b.     Competitive environment and Patent expiration:  A company may want to be acquired because it cannot face the aggressive competition by its competitors without extra help.  Another reason may be that a company may find itself in a situation where its exclusive patent is expiring and it may not be able to compete without extra help.

c.     Rapid growth or conversely stalled growth: In both cases a company may want to be acquired. In the event of rapid growth, to sustain working capital and in the event of stalled growth to further maximize profits.

d.    Shareholder pressure:  Shareholders may press for acquisition where a buyer is willing to offer complete liquidity to a group of shareholders.

e.     Technological obsolescence:  The technology used by a company may be obsolete or nearing obsolescence. It may want to be acquired so that the buyer may use it to convert it to new technology. In some ways we have seen such acquisitions in the print media market where newspapers have been taken over by technology companies who then convert existing newspapers into online portals.

 

The aforesaid reasons do not constitute an exhaustive list.

 

There are many reasons, administrative, legal and others, which may deter a company from acquiring or being acquired. These are as follows:

 

1.     Competition law concerns:  A merger may lead to anti-competitive and anti-trust challenges. The newly merged entity may become too big for its own good and such a merger may not be approved by the competition body or regulator. An excessively large market share or in Pakistan’s case any inhibition of competition when the merging parties cross thresholds defined by the Competition Act 2010 may automatically be challenged and may not be approved after the two review process.

 

2.     Regulatory concerns:  In certain industries, such as telecommunication in Pakistan, the regulator plays an important role in determining pricing structure and the role of a significant market player. For example the on cards merger/acquisition of Warid by Mobilink is still going to have to overcome regulatory hurdles and approvals.  Failure to get regulatory approvals for mergers can lead to 

 

3.     Surprises resulting from poor due diligence: This happens quite often in mergers and acquisitions. Nasty surprises such as an incomplete audit or failure to get an undertaking or overlooking a key balance sheet can have its own impact. Accurate due diligence would usually show the financial and legal health of an entity. An acquiring concern should not touch an encumbered target with a ten foot pole. It is not in a buyer’s interest to assume any liabilities which it is unaware of. 

 

4.     Lack of common vision: A lack of common vision between two managements may be a big deal breaker. A lack of common vision would mean that a convergence between the two managements would be impossible and therefore the merger or acquisition would be doomed from the start.

 

5.     Complex, Costly and Convoluted: Mergers and acquisitions are often very complex, are definitely very costly and extremely convoluted with regulatory codes and rules involved. The entire process requires a commitment and a spirit of fairness which is often lacking between two aggressive negotiating entities working at cross purposes. 

 

6.     Value reduction risk: Empirical evidence suggests that acquisition transaction often destroys value i.e. the acquiring entity or the merged entity is ultimately valued less than the two entities previously were in sum. Ultimately it is the opportunity cost of advantages gained from the merger or acquisition. Would that opportunity cost be acceptable?  Would it be offset by significant gains?  This is ultimately the call a merging or acquiring entity has to make.

 

7.     Seller’s acquisition risks: By putting itself out there for acquisition, a selling target exposes itself. For example a competitor may enter the bidding process only to be able to conduct due diligence on key and significant parts of the seller’s operations. It can obtain pay rates, HR data, proprietary information, key operating and engineering information, and product ranges both current and in pipeline.  Usually a confidentiality agreement is used to protect against this eventuality but their effectiveness is limited.

 

8.     Misdirected objectives:  An acquiring company may fail to pinpoint exactly what it wants out of the target acquisition. It may want the HR culture or work ethic but that may not happen simply because it takes over an entity. HR culture is not acquired but is embraced.

 

9.     Alternative of building instead of buying: An acquiring company may be acquiring a target because it wants to buy innovation and news ideas. However it may be cheaper for the acquiring company to actually invest in its own research and development which would lead to more organic innovation and add value to the company.

 

10.  Poor Governance, confusion and lack of leadership: In either merger or acquisition, there comes an extended period of poor governance because new management is slow in implementation of the plan or is unable to cope with fast changing situation on the ground. Poor governance causes confusion and is usually coupled with a lack of leadership. This is one of the major reasons to avoid a merger or acquisition situation because the risk is that residual benefits of any such acquisition would be squandered by either poor governance, infighting or confusion about the chain of command.

Rotterdam Rules

By Yasser Latif Hamdani


Introduction:

The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (hereinafter the “Rotterdam Rules” or the “Convention” as and where the context permits) was prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter “UNCITRAL”) and was designed to provide an alternative Hague Rules, Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules on international carriage of goods by sea.[1]  The Rotterdam Rules were adopted by the UN General Assembly on 11 December 2008 and were signed at ceremony in Rotterdam, Netherlands, on 23 September 2009 by 16 countries.[2] Till 2015 only a total of 25 countries have signed the Rotterdam Rules and only three countries have ratified Rotterdam Rules. As a consequence, the Rotterdam Rules are still not in force.  The controversies surrounding the ratification and adoption of the Rotterdam Rules, however, are not the topic of this paper as the question pertains to the scope of Rotterdam Rules, in terms of their application pursuant to the language of the Convention.

 

Scope of Application:

The Rotterdam Rules apply to “Contracts of Carriage” which are defined in Article 1(1) of the Convention. These are contracts of carriage where the carrier, against payment of freight, is tasked to take goods from one place to another. It is therefore envisages door to door multimodal transportation (as opposed to tackle to tackle regime under The Hague-Visby Rules which traditionally from the ship’s tackle is hooked on the port of loading to the moment it is unhooked at the port of discharge). It has to mandatorily have one leg at least by sea and can have more than one kind of transports. The Rotterdam Rules therefore apply to not only sea leg but land transportation as well and as such is seen as a replacement for not just the pre-existing The Hague, The Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules but also the Multimodal Convention of 1980.

Article 5 of the Rotterdam Rules makes it clear that it applies to a situation where place of receipt and place of delivery are in two different states and where – this is most important- port of loading and port of discharge are also in two different states. Additionally one of the following has to be in a contracting state: (i) place of receipt, (ii) port of loading, (iii) place of delivery; or (iv) port of discharge.  Article 5 is subject to exceptions or exclusions contained in Article 6 of the Rotterdam Rules. Article 6 supra excludes “Charter parties”, contracts for usage of ships for other reasons and non-liner transportation. Non-liner transportation may also be covered in the event that there is no Charter party or if there exists no contract for other use of the ship and where a transport document or an electronic transport record has been issued.  Article 7 further applies the convention not just to shipper and the carrier party to the contract but to holder or the controlling party as well.

Here it must be stated Article 82 of the Rotterdam Rules gives precedence to conventions applicable to other modes transportation including air transport, rail transport and inland waterways where there is no transshipment.  This means that when read with Article 26 of the Rotterdam Rules, the application of Rotterdam Rules will be limited to the sea leg and not to transportation before and after where another international instrument applies mandatorily.

Article 79 of the Rotterdam Rules declares any contractual term in a contract of carriage that clashes with the Convention is automatically void. However an exception is created for volume contracts under Article 80.  Volume contracts are defined in Article 1(2) of the Rotterdam Rules. A volume contract provides for a series of shipments of specified number of goods over an agreed period of time.

 

Carrier’s liability:

A carrier is defined as someone who enters into a contract with the shipper in Article 1(5) of the Rotterdam Rules. The carrier’s responsibility or liability encompasses the acts or omissions by performing parties, master and crew of the ship and employees of the carrier or the performing parties and any other person who assumes and performs the duties or responsibilities of a carrier. A performing party is most likely to be a subcontractor of the carrier when we consider the definition in Article 1(6).

The carrier’s duties are as follows:

(i)                 Transport document: Article 35 of the Rotterdam Rules place the duty to issue a transport document on the carrier, unless of course the parties have agreed not to use a transport document or where it is not the usual course of business or trade.  Under Article 1(8) these include “Electronic Transport Documents” thereby paving the way for ecommerce and the use of electronic means for contract of carriage.

 

(ii)               Duty to protect against loss, delay or damage (carrier’s fault): Article 17(1) of Rotterdam Rules makes the carrier liable for any loss, delay or damage arising out of the period of responsibility which is defined as from receipt to delivery under Article 13. However Article 17(2) limits the liability to fault of the carrier or any other person as defined under Article 18. Article 17(3) is a kind of a force majeure clause which limits the carrier’s liability. Articles 17(4) and 17(5) further crystallize the carrier’s liability if the event that carrier relies on can be shown to either be attributable to the carrier or a performing party or if the carrier can’t disprove his fault in any other circumstance or were caused by unseaworthiness or improper crewing or because the ship’s hold or deck were not fit for carriage. For matters pertaining to delay the claimant has to give a notice within 21 days or he loses his right to compensation under Article 23(4) of the Rotterdam Rules.

 

(iii)              Duty of care: There is a duty of care for goods during handling, stowing, transporting from door to door on the carrier under Article 13(1) of the Rotterdam Rules.

 

(iv)             Duty to keep the ship seaworthy and cargo-worthy:  The carrier is required under Article 14 to keep the ship seaworthy and cargo-worthy both at the start of the voyage and throughout it.

 

Shipper’s Liability:

A shipper is defined as someone who enters into contract with the carrier in Article 1(8) of the Rotterdam Rules. Article 1(9) further introduces the concept of a “documentary shipper” or a person who accepts to be named as the shipper on the transport document and/or contract or carriage. The liabilities of both a shipper and documentary shipper are identical.  In some cases a shipper is subject to strict liability and in others at fault liability like the carrier.

A shipper’s duties include the following:

(i)                 Duty to provide accurate information: Under Articles 28, 29 and 31 of the Rotterdam Rules a shipper is required to provide accurate and timely information to the carrier. Article 31 is a strict liability rule and as such the shipper indemnifies the carrier in this regard.

 

(ii)               Duty to inform carrier of dangerous nature of goods: Under Article 32 of the Rotterdam Rules, a shipper has to inform the carrier of the dangerous nature of goods and to clearly the mark the goods as dangerous. This too is a strict liability rule.

 

(iii)             Duty to perform obligations faithfully:  The shipper must perform obligations dutifully under the contract and is liable for any loss caused by any act of omission by the shipper, documentary shipper or the shipper’s employees etc under Article 30 of the Rotterdam Rules. With the exception of Articles 31 and 32, this is an at-fault liability rule.

 

Limitation of Liability:

Rotterdam Rules limit the liability of the carrier to 875 units of accounts per package or 3 units of accounts per kilogram under Article 59 of the Convention. This is where either the value of goods has been declared by the shipper or where a higher amount has been agreed between the parties. A unit of account is defined is the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”) as laid down by the IMF in Article 59(3). This then is to be converted to a contracting state’s currency in accordance with IMF procedure. Article 59 as a whole is subject to Article 60 of the Rotterdam Rules which states that liability for delay would be limited to two and a half times of the freight paid. The sum total however has been limited to the amount payable under Article 59(1) i.e. 875 SDR per package or 3 SDR per kilogram. Article 62 further limits the operation of limitation of liability where a loss is attributable to a breach of obligation by the carrier or a performing party and their employees etc. In this case the carrier loses the right to limit liability.

 

Delivery on Electronic Transport Document, Negotiable Transport Documents, and Negotiable Electronic Transport Document:

A very important and much needed provision in the Rotterdam Rules is the acceptance of Electronic Transport Document and delivery on such a document. Rotterdam Rules also govern those situations where the receiver does not have the transport document. Similarly it governs the use of negotiable transport documents and negotiable electronic transport documents under Article 47 of the Rotterdam Rules. An example of a negotiable transport document is a bill of lading.

 

Containerization: 

Given the multimodal nature of transport envisaged under the Rotterdam Rules, the Convention is a big nod towards containerization.[3]  The use of intermodal containers have revolutionized the field of shipping. Given that the same container can be used across rail truck and sea transport does away with the hassle of there being separate contracts of carriages.[4] The Rotterdam Rules now give an overarching legal cover for the operation of intermodal containers.

 

Statute of limitations/Time Bar:

Under Article 62 of the Rotterdam Rules, a claim has to be brought within two years of delivery or the time when delivery should have taken place. For delay the shipper has to notify the carrier of a loss within 21 days under Article 23(4) supra.

 

Jurisdiction:

Under Article 66 of the Rotterdam Rules, judicial proceedings (as well as arbitral proceedings) can be instituted in the following places:

(i)                 Domicile of the carrier; or

(ii)               Place of receipt; or

(iii)             Place of delivery; or

(iv)             Port of loading; or

(v)               Port of discharge; or

(vi)             A place agreed by the parties in contract.

 Article 68 further introduces following places of jurisdiction for actions against a maritime performing party (which would be a sub-carrier or sub-contractor of carrier by sea):

(i)                 Domicile of the maritime performing party; or

(ii)               The port where maritime performing party took charge of the goods; or

(iii)             The port where maritime performing party delivered the goods; or

(iv)             The port where maritime performing party usually performs services related to goods.

 

Conclusion:

The Rotterdam Rules build upon at times and at times significantly depart from The Hague Rules, The Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. Indeed they go beyond them by envisaging door to door multimodal transport as opposed to merely sea transport. The Rotterdam Rules apply to multimodal contracts of carriage with at least one international sea leg.  In other modes of transport the Rotterdam Rules usually defer to other conventions if any. It has also facilitated the growth of containerization by adopting a multimodal approach and providing a legal framework for door to door transport. Another important introduction is that of electronic transport documents and records which the Rotterdam Rules explicitly recognize and set out a framework for.

 

Wednesday, February 10, 2016

UNIDROIT Principles and CISG

By Yasser Latif Hamdani

I.                   Introduction: CISG and UNIDROIT

The United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sales of Goods (“CISG”) is a convention that was signed in Vienna in 1980 (though it was not until 1987 that it had the requisite number of ratifications required to make it a binding multilateral treaty) and has been ratified since then by 83 countries to date. Developed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), it seeks to harmonize and create unified international sales law.  It was the result of 51 years of collective efforts initiated by International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”).[1] It was in 1968 when UNCITRAL began its efforts that the 1920s proposal of Professor Ernst Rabel, a German Comparativist and thinker, finally began taking shape. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”) were drawn up by the efforts of UNIDROIT in 1994 and subsequently enlarged in 2004. A third edition of the UNIDROIT Principles was drawn up in 2010. Both the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles are part of the Lex Mercatoria or the “merchant law” and in particular the merchant law as it applies internationally.  One could imagine the CISG as a codification of principles and the UNIDROIT Principles as international common law of contracts.  It may be stated here, however, that even though UNIDROIT Principles were drafted with CISG very much in the background, UNIDROIT Principles have a wider application than simply sales of goods and covers a broader field of contracts and law, including for example Lex Sportiva (Sports law).  For the purposes of this research paper, however, I will only consider applications of UNIDROIT Principles as they relate to international sales of goods and in particular the CISG.

While CISG is an international treaty which binds its contracting states to the language of the convention.  UNIDROIT Principles on the other hand are principles that were drawn up by a body of professional international lawyers, jurists and thinkers with the express purpose, inter alia, “they may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments”.[2] Nevertheless there were many people who had participated in both endeavors. Therefore in many ways the UNIDROIT Principles filled up those gaps in the CISG that were but the obvious result of diplomacy and compromise required to arrive at a complex multilateral treaty such as CISG. Therefore the UNIDROIT Principles can be seen an aid and a supplementary device by which CISG can be applied.  This has basis in CISG itself as I will argue in some detail below in light of case law now before us. To answer the question broadly however, the nexus between CISG and UNIDROIT is to be found in the application of UNIDROIT Principles to the interpretation of the CISG and corresponding domestic law (in to which arbitrators and courts are duty-bound to read CISG).  The basis of this is Article 7 of the CISG which states its international character [3] and leaves room open for application of general principles and private international law.[4] Article 7(1) of the CISG states:

“…in the interpretation of this Convention regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.”[5]

Article 7(2) of the CISG states:

“Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.”[6]

Professor Michael Joachim Bonell, one of UNIDROIT’s leading legal consultants and one of the people who helped frame the UNIDROIT Principles, has written in some detail on the issue of UNIDROIT Principles being supplementary to the CISG.  In one of his seminal papers on the nexus between the two, he points out that CISG was the best that could be achieved by way of legislation, while UNIDROIT Principles are the restatement of international contract law.[7] While explaining the formulation of UNIDROIT Principles, he explains that CISG was an obligatory point of reference for the framers of the CISG. The UNIDROIT Principles, therefore, were designed to explain unclear language and to fill those gaps that were left by framing of CISG. This being the explicit intent of the UNIDROIT Principles, as evidenced by Professor Bonell’s aforesaid paper, I will attempt to analyze the nexus between the two by listing and explaining the case law (both through arbitral awards and through national courts) that has read into, for all practical purposes, the UNIDROIT Principles into the CISG as far as the two are compatible.

                         

II.                 Examples of how UNIDROIT Principles have been used to supplement CISG (Non-exhaustive list of cases and arbitral awards)

 

A.    Determination of Interest Rate in accordance with UNIDROIT Principles while applying CISG

Some of the earliest cases or arbitral awards that referred to UNIDROIT Principles applied Article 78 of the CISG in conjunction with Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles. Article 78 of the CISG does not clarify what the applicable rate of interest should be and therefore requires Article 7.4.9 as an aid. The first case in this regard comes in form of an arbitral award from 1994 by Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft – Wien in which the arbitrators laid down that the matter of interest rate was governed but not “expressly settled” by the CISG. Therefore the Arbitrators referred to Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles which stated that the average prime rate in the buyer’s country would apply.[8] We see the application of the same Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles in a decision by ICC International Court of Arbitration in 1995.[9]  Since then arbitral courts around the world have repeatedly referred to the Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles to settle the question of interest rates in international commercial contracts. 

B.     Question of Hardship

In the case of Scafom International BV vs Lorraine Tubes s.a.s, the Court of Cassation of Belgium ruled that a contract was silent on the issue of re-negotiation due to hardship. Therefore reference was made to Article 7(2) of the CISG (i.e. use of general principles) and correspondingly to “the general principles governing the law of international commerce, concluded that according to such principles as laid down, among others, in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts”.[10] Re-negotiation due to hardship was allowed consequently in line with the UNIDROIT Principles. This was upheld by the Supreme Court of Belgium.

C.    Pre-Contractual Negotiation and Common Intention

In the case of Proforce Recruit Limited v. The Rugby Group Limited, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) of the UK ruled that pre-contractual negotiations and common intention of the parties were relevant to determination of the dispute. In particular reference was made to UNIDROIT Principles, Articles 4.1 to 4.3 read with Article 8 of the CISG which was the governing convention.[11] This was again upheld in the case of The Square Mile Partnership Ltd v Fitzmaurice McCall Ltd[12] and in Chartbrook Limited v. Persimmon Homes Limited.[13]

Another judgment on point came from New Zealand’s Court of Appeals in the case of Hideo Yoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Limited which while applying Articles 4.1 to 4.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles described them as being “in the nature of a restatement of the commercial contract law of the world [and which] refines and expands the principles contained in the United Nations Convention.”[14]

D.    Place of Performance of Obligation

In the case of SCEA GAEC Des Beauches Bernard Bruno v. Société Teso Ten Elsen GmbH & COKG affirming the principle contained in Article 57 of the CISG, the French Cour d'appel de Grenoble referred to Article 6.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles to settle the question of obligation pertaining to payment i.e. place of such payment should be the creditor’s place of business.[15]

E.     Reasonable opportunity to be acquainted with standard terms

Netherland’s Hof 'S-Hertogenbosch applied Article 2.20 of 1994 UNIDROIT Principles to settle the dispute of whether a buyer should have reasonable opportunity to get acquainted with the seller’s standard terms, a question on which CISG was silent. [16]

F.     Limitation Period

In the case of Castellana Inmuebles Y Locales S.A. v. Brunello Cucinelli SPA, Spain’s Audiencia Provincial Madrid SPA noting that CISG was silent on limitation applied Article 10.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles to determine the limitation period. [17]

G.    Formation of Contract

Ruling on a contract between a Finish company and a French company (which in its Russian version invoked Swedish law) and applying CISG by virtue of the CISG’s incorporation in domestic laws of France, Finland and Sweden, the ICC International Court of Arbitration applied UNIDROIT Principles as a supplementary device to CISG and also as the governing principles for contract formation.[18]

III.             The appropriate role for UNIDROIT Principles vis a vis CISG: A contested issue

The upshot of the case law discussed above is that UNIDROIT Principles have been applied in three main ways in conjunction with CISG.

a.       Application of UNIDROIT Principles when CISG is silent on an issue (Gap filler).

b.      Application of UNIDROIT Principles as a supplement to CISG and as universal trade usage.

c.       Application of UNIDROIT Principles independently by way of a contractual clause as an aid to interpret international contracts. This imagines an independent status for UNIDROIT Principles even when they do not directly correspond to CISG or are not moored in CISG.

Of the three, the first two scenarios are directly relevant to the main thrust of the question before us.  The first application i.e. where CISG is silent has a necessary first step and that is the legal basis for reference to CISG. This usually happens by one of two ways. The first way is if the contract is between two parties, either of which is based in a contracting state and the governing law is of the contracting state.  In that case the CISG is to be read into the domestic law, either automatically (in the event the contracting state is monist) or by incorporation into domestic legislation (if the contracting state is dualist).  Once the CISG is considered part of the domestic law, a court taking cognizance of dispute arising out of such a contract must apply CISG to its interpretation. Second way is when a clause in the contract refers specifically to CISG as the governing law. It may be the case that the contract either refers to CISG or both. Professor Bonell recommends the following clause: “This contract shall be governed by CISG, and with respect to matters not covered by this Convention, by the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.” Once the CISG is found to be silent on a certain point or non-conclusive, the case law above suggests a recourse to UNIDROIT Principles to complement the CISG. 

So how does UNIDROIT Principles interact with the CISG? I have given case law above that elucidates the ratio of various judgments and arbitral awards on specific points. However the application of UNIDROIT Principles when interpreting, complementing or supplementing the CISG is wider.  As mentioned earlier the UNIDROIT Principles were not meant to be a binding document unlike CISG and therefore the leeway available to its drafters was much greater than what was possible in diplomacy, tact and compromise that was required in framing the CISG.  This means that UNIDROIT Principles are a more comprehensive framework and one which in application goes beyond merely CISG.

The international character of CISG and its deference to general principles and private international law as given in Article 7 mentioned hereinabove, means that judges and arbitrators have had to rely on their own devices to interpret and implement CISG. In this respect UNIDROIT is a veritable guide for interpretation. Professor Bonell points out that fundamental breach of contract for example is better defined and laid out in Article 7.3.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles than in Article 25 of the CISG.[19] He points out that Article 7.1.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles may be used as the complementary device to Article 48 of the CISG where doubts about the right to cure by a non-performing party exist.[20]  Professor Bonell also speaks at length about the application of interest rate under UNIDROIT Principles i.e. Article 7.4.9, which we have seen above in the case law as well.  His view is largely shared by Professor Anna Veneziano, an Italian professor of law, in her paper on “Change of circumstances and the duty to renegotiate according Belgian Supreme Court” where she discusses the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision upholding Belgian Court of Cassation’s decision in the Lorraine Tubes case mentioned hereinabove. She is wholly supportive of the idea of usage of UNIDROIT Principles as a means to elaborate the CISG and its corresponding impact on domestic law and jurisprudence.[21]

 This position is contested to a certain extent by Professor John Y Gotanda who argues that UNIDROIT Principles were not meant to be “gap-fillers” in the CISG. He argues that essential mechanism provided by the CISG to fill the gaps precludes the application of the UNIDROIT Principles as the principal source of authority on whose touchstone the CISG can be interpreted.  He argues that UNIDROIT Principles are not merely the restatement of general principles of international contract law but are intended to be the embodiment of best practices and solutions. Professor Gotanda reads the scope of Article 7(2) of the CISG as being limited to that principle being “moored” to the basic premise of a provision of CISG. He points in particular to the application of Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles in conjunction with Articles 74 and 78 of the CISG as being an overreach by arbitrators and judges and argues that the former actually upends the latter. He argues that by allowing interest at a lending rate (which the UNIDROIT Principles allow), when read in conjunction with the provision of Article 74 which allows for actual damages including any loss from borrowing money, means that an aggrieved party may not borrow against funds owed and may reinvest leading to the ultimate conclusion that application of UNIDROIT Principles may overcompensate the aggrieved party.[22] Professor Gotanda further argues that if CISG is silent on an issue or if there are gaps after application of its literal text, the recourse must be to domestic law. He also argues against the application of UNIDROIT Principles as trade usages by arguing that approach forwarded by UNIDROIT Principles do not constitute “universal trade usage”. Still he believes that they can inform the CISG as solutions that can resolve some unanswered dilemmas left open by the text of CISG.[23]

 

IV.             Conclusion

The conclusion I draw from the foregoing discussion is that arbitrators and judges have on numerous occasions applied UNIDROIT Principles as gap fillers for CISG by relying on Article 7(2) of the CISG which calls for resolution through application of general principles of private international law. My view is closer to Professor Bonell’s view which sees UNIDROIT Principles being drafted in the backdrop of CISG and therefore, I concur with the view that UNIDROIT Principles are moored in the premises that led to the adoption of CISG by contracting states. I do not wholly agree with Professor Gotanda’s view that the recourse must first be had to domestic law because I believe that the entire purpose of CISG was to harmonize and unify international law on sales of goods. Furthermore one can argue that UNIDROIT Principles are not incompatible with domestic law to begin with. Professor Gotanda’s example using interest rates is too stretched and at best esoteric given the overall thrust behind the effort to harmonize and unify transnational commercial law. UNIDROIT Principles, therefore, in my view are the foremost authority in determining and filling the gaps that may occur in application of CISG. I also agree with the camp that argues that UNIDROIT Principles constitute universal trade usages and therefore are directly applicable. The world needs universal principles for international trade and commerce and UNIDROIT Principles do an admirable job in supplementing conventions like the CISG. This is precisely why arbitrators and judges use them in the manner they have done so in the aforesaid case law on the subject.

 

 

 

 




[2] See the Preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles
[3] Article 7(1) of the CISG
[4] Article 7(2) of the CISG
[5] Article 7(1) of the CISG
[6] Article 7(2) of the CISG
[8] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=635 accessed on 10 December 2015
[9] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=637 accessed on 10 December 2015
[10] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1456 accessed on 10 December 2015
[11] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1119 accessed on 10 December 2015
[12] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1156 accessed on 10 December 2015
[13] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1373 accessed on 10 December 2015
[14] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=802 accessed on 10 December 2015
[15] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=638 accessed on 10 December 2015
[16] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=959 accessed on 10 December 2015
[17] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1907 accessed on 10 December 2015
[18] http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1403 accessed on 10 December 2015
 
[19]Bonell, Michael J, THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND CISG -- ALTERNATIVES OR COMPLEMENTARY INSTRUMENTS ? http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html#mjb64 Accessed on December 11, 2015.
[20] Ibid
[21]Veneziano, Anna, UNIDROIT Principles and CISG : Change of Circumstances and Duty to Renegotiate according to the Belgian Supreme Court http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2010-1-veneziano-e.pdf Accessed on December 11, 2015.
[22] Gotanda, John Y, Using the Unidroit Principles to Fill Gaps in the CISG http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1089&context=wps Accessed on December 12, 2015
[23] Ibid